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INTEREST AND CONCERN OF THE AMICUS1
The National Academy of Arbitrators was
founded in 1947 "to foster the highest standards of
integrity, competence, honor and character among
those engaged in the arbitration of industrial
disputes on a professional basis," to adopt and secure
adherence to canons of professional ethics, and to
promote the study and understanding of the
arbitration of industrial disputes.     GLADYS
GRUENBERG, JOYCE NAJITA 8~ DENNIS NOLAN, THE
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS: FIFTY YEARS IN
THE WORLD OF WORK 26 (1997). As the historians of
the Academy observe, the Academy has been "a
primary force in shaping American labor
arbitration." Id.
The Academy’s stringent rules assure that only
the most active, ethical, and well-respected
practitioners are elected to membership along with
scholars specially selected for significant
contributions to the understanding of labor law and
labor relations. Members are prohibited from
serving as advocates or consultants in labor
relations, from being associated with firms that
perform those functions, and from serving as expert
witnesses on behalf of labor or management.
Currently, the Academy has approximately 650 U.S.
and Canadian members.
1 Rule 37.6 statement: Counsel of record is the sole author
of this brief. No person or entity other than the National
Academy of Arbitrators has made any monetary contribution
to the preparation or submission of this brief, Letters reflecting
the consent of the parties to the filing of this brief have been
filed with the Clerk.
The traditional function of labor arbitration was
to resolve disputes between management and labor
primarily involving questions of interpretation and
application of the terms of collective bargaining
agreements grievance arbitration. Arbitration of
disputes as to the application and interpretation of
statutes protecting individual employees agai:nst
specified forms of employment discrimination has
not been a traditional function of labor arbitration.
Recognizing that such a form of arbitration was
becoming a part of the American landscape, the
Academy was a prime mover in what was to become
the 1995 multi-partite Due Process Protocol for
Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes
Arising Out of the Employment Relationship. The
Academy also amended its constitution and by-laws
to encompass study and educational activity with
respect to employment arbitration. Although it has
continued to limit its membership primarily to those
accomplished in traditional labor arbitration, its
membership does include some who also serve as
employment arbitrators.
In keeping with its educational mission, the
Academy has appeared before this Court as amicus
curiae in cases concerning the law of arbitrati.on
under collective agreements, i.e., labor arbitration,
AT& T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers
of America, 475 U.S. 643 (1986), and Eastern
Associated Coal Corp. v. united Mine Workers, 531
U.So 57 (2000), in cases concerning the emerging law
of the arbitration of individual statutory claims, i.e.,
employment arbitration, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), and. in Wright v.
Universal Maritime Service Corp., 525 U.S. 70
(1998), where the two might conflate. In that case,
3the Court chose "not [to] reach the question"
presented here. Id. at 82.
The Academy believes it is specially situated to
advise the Court in this case. The Academy’s
expertise provides the Court a deep understanding of
how individual statutory claims relate to the system
of industrial self-governmentof which labor
arbitration is so integral a part.
It may appear odd that an association of
professional labor arbitrators is advancing a position
that would restrict the role of labor arbitration. The
seeming oddity evaporates once the Court
understands that the Academy’s position is grounded
in its fundamental educational mission: to bring to
bear its experience and considered judgment to the
question of what best comports with the nation’s
system of industrial self-government and of how
individual civil rights in employment are best
protected.
4STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Amicus NAA defers to the Respondents’
Statement of the Case2 but it wishes to draw the
Court’s attention to three aspects of the instant
collective bargaining agreement that play a criti~cal
role. First are the Grievance-Arbitration provisions
of Arts. V and VI. As a matter of industrial practice,
these are in all important respects routine. Art. V
sets out the various steps tlhrough which a grievmace
proceeds in an effort at resolution between the union
and management short of arbitration, including a
contractual statute of limitations. Art. VI governs
the submission to arbitration of disputes ’%etween
the parties" to the collective agreement. Consistent
with the practice and philosophy of collective
bargaining, under Art. VI the union and only ~he
union controls whether or not a grievance will
proceed to arbitration. THE COMMON LAW OF THE
WORKPLACE § 1.29 (Theodore J. St. Antoine ed.. 2d
ed. 2005); ELKOURI ~ ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION
2 The Petitioners have asserted that, under the instant
grievance procedure, "the Union permits the employee to
pursue the discrimination claims in the arbitration forum with
his or her attorney." Petition for Certiorari at 5. The record
does not substantiate the use of the present indicative
"permits." The collective agreement makes no provision for the
individual to proceed to arbitration independent of the umon.
In this case, the union "consented" on an ad hoc basis to the
plaintiffs’ "use" of the Office of Contract Arbitration (OCA)
created under the collective bargaining agreement to hear their
age discrimination claim so long as the plaintiffs bore the cost.
Pet. App. 42a. That ad hoc decision made labor arbitration
"available" to these employees. Brief for the Petitioners at 16.
But the union was not obligated to allow it. Indeed. the
Petitioners recognize as much in their treatment of the avenues
of redress available to the employee whose civil rights claiims
the union declines to pursue. Id..at 41-43.
5WORKS 243 (Alan Ruben ed., 6th ed. 2003). In labor
parlance. "’The grievance belongs to the union.’"
Clyde Summers. Individualism, Collectivism and
Autonomy in American Labor Law. 5 EMPLOYEE RTS.
& EMPLOYMENT POL’Y J. 453. 487 (2001). A collective
agreement could grant employees the right to
proceed to arbitration independent of the union, id.;
but such provisions are extremely rare in the private
sector, if they exist at all, and this collective
agreement makes no such provision.3
Second is the non-discrimination article set out
in the Brief for the Petitioners at 5-6. Collective
agreements often prohibit discrimination on one or
more invidious grounds, but this collective
agreement’s non-discrimination provision is. in
amicus NAA’s experience, unique. Not only does it
enumerate the federal and state labor protective
laws it specifically sweeps in, it provides that: "All
such claims shall be subject to the grievance and
arbitration procedure (Articles V and VI) as the sole
and exclusive remedy for violations." Id. at 6
(emphasis added). The Petitioners argue that "this
language" was "specifically crafted" as clearly and
unmistakably to preclude de novo judicial access for
those statutory claims. Id. No reason appears to
question this assertion, but the record is silent
regarding the provision’s bargaining history.
Third is the agreement’s treatment of
subcontracting. The last major survey of the
contents of collective agreements by subject matter,
unfortunately now of some vintage, found that about
58% of collective agreements in non-manufacturing
dealt with subcontracting: for the most part by
3 Supra note 2.
6reserving it for future bargaining, by prohibiting it if
layoffs would result, by allowing it only wb.ere
bargaining unit employees with necessary skills or
equipment were not available, or by requiring
adherence to past subcontracting practices. BUREAU
OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, BASIC PATTERNS IN [~N[ON
CONTRACTS 80 (14th ed. 1995). Art. 54of this
collective agreement contains an absolute
prohibition: "There shall be no subcontracting of
bargaining unit work during the term of this
Agreement." Joint App. Before the Court of Appeals
at A215. This provision bears on the analysis in
Section I of the Argument, infra.
7SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.,
supra, this Court expressly reserved on whether
subsuming civil rights claims into a collective
bargaining    agreement’s    grievance-arbitration
procedure would preclude access to the courts de
novo. Id. at 82. That question is presented here.
Amicus NAA submits two propositions to be
dispositive. First, the doubt this Court expressed
over thirty years ago that statutory civil rights would
be protected adequately by mapping them on to the
grievance procedures of collective bargaining
agreements continues to be well founded. Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36~ 58 (1974). That
skepticism is unaffected by the Court’s allowance,
subsequent to Gardner-Denver, of employment
arbitration to substitute for civil litigation.
Subsuming civil rights for preclusive disposition by a
collective agreement’s grievance procedure places the
vindication of those rights in the hands of the union,
subject only to its duty of fair representation. But a
union’s adherence to a duty of fair representation in
deciding not to pursue an employee’s civil rights
claim is no substitute for an adjudication on the
merits of the claim: the vindication of a minority’s
statutory civil rights should not depend on the
dispensation of any majority however well
intentioned it might be.
Second, Gardner-Denver’s allowance of two
separate tracks for the vindication of workplace
rights has not proven burdensome. If a collective
agreement contains an applicable non-discrimination
clause, its administration by the union up to and
including non-preclusive arbitration provides a cost-
8effective system for resolving the vast majority of
civil rights claims without sacrificing those l~ew
whose claims are arbitrated by their unions
negligently or not arbitrated at all,
ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTORY
At first blush, the current state of the law would
seem to be anomalous: an unrepresented employee
is deemed capable freely to consent to a contract of
employment, albeit a contract of adhesion, pursuant
to which her statutory civil rights are to be decided
definitively by an employment arbitrator instead of a
court (where state law would allow such agreement
to be enforced4), but a union is not free to agree to
have the same rights definitively resolved in labor
arbitration as the product not of a unilateral
managerial fiat but of an arms-length bargain.
Consequently, the Court in Wright v. Universal
Maritime Service Corp., supra, perceived there to be
two bodies of law in "tension" with one another--one
generated under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),
the other generated under the National Labor
Relations Act. Id. at 76. The Petitioners say as
much. Brief for the Petitioners at 30-31.
The anomaly is only seeming. The apparent
"tension" disappears once it is understood that what
is presented are two entirely different systems. The
Court is not being asked in this case to sanction the
submission of civil rights claims exclusively to
arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement.
The Court is being asked to sanction the submission
of those claims exclusively to a collective agreement’s
grievance procedure that may not result in
arbitration. Accordingly, it would assist the Court
~ See Steven Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to
Arbitration: Federal Preemption, Contract Unconscionability
and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISPUTE RES. 469
(reviewing state decisional law).
10
briefly to lay out the underpinnings of the l~wo
different systems the Petitioners are asking the
Court to conflate.
Labor arbitration is the product of the system of
collective bargaining, erected on the statutory
foundation of the Wagner Act of 1935, that grew’ to
maturity in the post-War period. In the 1940s and
1950s, as in the 1930s, there were few statutory
workplace rights: the common assumption was tlhat
workers were entitled only to those rights t]~at
unions were able to secure for them.
How to police the parties’ self-adopted obligations
presented a major legal and societal question.
Unions had long tended to eschew the courts, which
they distrusted, in preference to self-help; but the
strike is a blunt and often awkward instrument and
certainly not one to be resorted to frequently or over
minor disputes. During the war, management and
labor had grown accustomed to dispute resolution by
arbitrators, at the behest of the War Labor Board.
But even after the war, so experienced a labor umpire
as Harry Shulman argued that the law’s approach, to
labor arbitration--premised as "an integral part of
the system of self-government" should be hands off.
Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract and Law in Labor
Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999, 1024 (1955). The
Court accepted Shulman’s premise, but instead
shaped the law to conform to it.
In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448 (1957), the Court held a collective
agreement’s commitment to grievance arbitration to
be specifically enforceable, not, however, by reference
to the Federal Arbitration Act, but to § 301 of the
Taft-Hartley Act.    In the Court’s view, § 301
11
commissioned a uniform federal common law of the
collective agreement fashioned by the judiciary out of
national labor policy and limited only by judicial
"inventiveness." Id. at 457. Three years later, in the
Steelworkers Trilogy, the Court acknowledged labor
arbitration as an integral element of the autonomous
system of self-government created by the collective
bargaining relationship. United Steelworkers of
America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960),
United Steelworkers of American v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), and United
Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). The Court stressed that.
unlike the commercial context, where arbitration is a
substitute for litigation, in the collective bargaining
context labor arbitration substitutes for the strike.
Not surprisingly, because a collective agreement
bears scant similarity to a commercial contract or
even a contract of employment, the legal nature of
the collective agreement proved challenging. J.1.
Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 335 (1944)
(distinguishing the collective bargaining agreement
from a "contract of employment"). Scholars differed
deeply over whether the collective agreement
conferred any individual rights on the employees
governed by it at all, or whether the collective
agreement was a set of rules and practices that
governed the workplace the only legally enforceable
aspect of which being an obligation to arbitrate those
disputes that the union chose to press. Compare
Clyde Summers, Individual Rights in Collective
Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 362
(1972), with David Feller, The General Theory of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CAL. L. REV. 663
(1973).
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In fashioning the federal common law of the
collective agreement, the Court accommodated the
union’s crucial role in the system of industrial
collective self-government even as it countenanced
the possibility of an accrual of individual contractual
rights: the individual employee had first to attempt
to exhaust the grievance-arbitration procedure,
Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox. 379 U.S. 650 (1965),
and could thereafter sue the employer for an alleged
breach of contractual rights only if she could prove
that the union had breached its duty of fair
representation either in declining to take her case to
arbitration, Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), or in
its presentation of the claim in arbitration, Hine,~ v.
Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (19’76).
That the contractual claim was in fact meritorious is
not dispositive of whether the union breached its
duty of fair representation in declining to bring it
before an arbitrator, Vaca v. Sipes, supra, at 192-93.
such being the union’s crucial role in the system.
By the early 70s, however, the legal landscape on
which the system of collective bargaining plays out
had changed. An expanding number of individual
workplace rights were being legislated, especially
in statutes prohibiting employment discrimination.
How these laws related to the autonomous system
of collective bargaining and grievance arbitration
was addressed in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co..
supra. The decision need not be rehearsed. It is
enough to say that the Court saw two quite different
legal regimes at work: the collective agreement
policed by the union through the grieva~ace
procedure; and positivelaw policed via litigation
in the courts. Where the collective agreement
also committed the parties to observe principles of
13
non-discrimination as a contractual obligation, the
union’s resort to labor arbitration was not preclusive
of the individual’s resort to the courts: "Both rights
have legally independent origins and are equally
available to the aggrieved employee." Gardner-
Denver, supra, at 52.
The Gardner-Denver Court addressed the
argument that the union had waived the individual
employee’s access to Title VII and rejected it in
part--but only in part-on the ground that statutory
rights may not be sub mitted to private arbitration for
final disposition, id. at 51-52. citing Wilko v. Swan,
346 U.S. 427 (1953). Inasmuch as Wilko was
overruled in 1989, were it the sole basis of decision,
the "tension" adverted to at the outset of this
Introductory would be well placed. But there was a
good deal more at work in Gardner-Denver than
Wilko’s now discarded notion that law can be decided
only by a court. Just as the Court had in the Trilogy,
the Gardner-Denver Court dwelt on the system of
self-government created by collective bargaining, id.
at 52-53, not only on the labor arbitrator’s role in
that system, id., but, even more importantly, on the
union’s role. The Court was skeptical that the
autonomous system of industrial self-government
could be expected to vindicate individual statutory
rights, a skepticism grounded in
the union’s exclusive control over the manner
and extent to which an individual grievance is
presented .... In arbitration, as in the
collective-bargaining process, the interests of
the individual employee may be subordinated
to the collective interests of all employees in
the bargaining unit .... Moreover. harmony
of interest between the union and the
14
individual employee cannot always be
presumed, especially where a claim of racial.
discrimination is made .... And a breach of
the union’s duty of fair representation may
prove difficult to establish.
Id. at 58 (citations omitted).
Over the course of the past decade and a half.
employer resort to individual contracts of adhee~ion
to sweep statutory civil, rights into employer-
promulgated arbitration systems has grown apace.
Alexander Colvin, Empirical Research on
Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst the Sound
and Fury?, 11 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405,
408-12 (2007). As a result, for many non-unionized
employees the judicial track for the vindication, of
civil rights claims has been substituted for by an
arbitral track; but that substitution works no cha~age
in the bases upon which Gardner-Denver rests. N,~w,
as then, there are two very different regimes:
On the one hand is employment arbitration. This
is conducted under an individual contract, for the
most part addressed by the Federal Arbitration
Act governing an individual "transaction involving
commerce," 9 U.S.C. § 2, the enforceability of which
is determined by state law, id., under which the
individual has resort to an arbitrator commonly
selected from a special panel of employment
arbitrators most often trained in law, Jacquelin
Drucker, The Protocol in Practice: Reflections,
Assessments, Issues for Discussion, and Suggested
Actions, 11 EMPLOYEE RTSo & EMP. POL’Y J. 345, 355
(2007), subject to procedures that, as a substitute for
litigation, customarily include pre-trial discow~ry,
e.g., American Arbitration Association, National
15
Rules for Resolution of Employment Disputes. Rule 9
(July 1, 2006), in which proceeding the employee has
a right to representation by counsel--the individual
employee being the client to whom professional
responsibility is owed--id., Rule 19, in which the
burdens of proof, often a key element in civil rights
litigation, are those the respective parties would bear
under the applicable civil rights statute, id., Rule 28.
and out of which the full range of statutory relief is
expected to be afforded.
On the other is labor arbitration. This is the
product of a collective agreement--a system of on-
going collective self-government, not an individual
"transaction." in which access to and the conduct of
the arbitration is controlled by the union, not the
individual, the enforceability of which is governed by
a uniform federal common law of the collective
agreement under § 301, not by the FAA or state law,
in which claims are heard by persons commonly
selected from a special panel of labor arbitrators
designated as such, often persons not legally trained,
Joseph Krislov, Entry and Acceptability in the
Arbitration Profession: A Long Way to Go, in
LABOR ARBITRATION IN AMERICA: THE PROFESSION IN
PRACTICE ch. 4 (Mario Bognanno & Charles Coleman
eds., 1992) (almost 40% of labor arbitrators are
trained in industrial relations, not law), subject to
procedures that, grounded in industrial relations, do
not include pre-trial discovery, THE COMMON LAW OF
THE WORKPLACE. supra, at § 1.13, in which a legal
representative’s professional obligation (if there is
legal representation) runs to the client union, not to
the grievant employee, in which burdens of proof, as
a matter of industrial relations, rarely play a role, id.
§ 1.92, at p. 54, and out of which the labor arbitrator
16
is expected to award only such relief as the collective
agreement contemplates, id. § 10.1.
It is true that both employment arbitration and
labor arbitration are called "arbitration." But just as
hounds and greyhounds, mongrels and spaniels are
all called dogs, Macbeth, Act III, scene 1, they’re not
the same animal.
Consequently, the skepticism the Court expressed
in Gardner-Denver for the suitability of submitting
statutory claims to preclusive resort to a collective
agreement’s grievance procedure persists and
rightly. The question is not whether employment
arbitrators may be deputed by contracts of
employment to vindicate statutory civil rights in
lieu of the courts. The question is whether the
vindication of these rights can be mapped on to the
system of collective self-government in which labor
arbitration is embedded.
A COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT MAY NOT
RELEGATE THE VINDICATION OF
INDIVIDUAL STATUTORY CIVIL RIGHTS
EXCLUSIVELY TO    ITS    GRIEVANCE
PROCEDURE
The question before tl~e Court is not whether to
give judicially preclusive effect to an agreement that
allows an employee to arbitrate his ADEA claim, for
that is not what this collective agreement does.5 The
question is whether to give preclusive effect to the
submission of ADEA claims "solely and exclusively"
to the collective agreement’s grievance procedure.
The potential end point of that procedure is
arbitration; but the union ~nay decline to proceed to
See supra note 2.
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arbitration, just as it did here. The union’s discretion
in making that decision is constrained by a duty of
fair representation. But adherence to the duty of fair
representation is simply no substitute for a hearing
on the merits of the claim.
The standards of fair representation are "highly
deferential" to the union. Airline Pilots v. O’Neill,
499 U.S. 65, 78 (1991). See generally ROBERT
GORMAN & MATTHEW FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR
LAW cho 30 (2d ed. 2004). Crudely, the union may not
decline to pursue a grievance out of malice, hostility,
discrimination~ or bad faith; nor, less crudely, may it
"arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process
it in a perfunctory fashion." Vaca v. Sipes. supra, at
191. Before United Steelworkers of America v.
Rawson, 495 U.S. 362 (1990), the courts were at 6s
and 7s on how restrictive the test of "perfunctoriness"
was. But in Rawson the Court resolved that question
categorically:
This duty of fair representation is of major
importance, but a breach occurs "only when a
union’s conduct toward a member of the
collective bargaining unit is arbitrary,
discretionary, or in bad faith." [citing Vaca v.
Sipes, supra] The courts have in general
assumed that mere negligence, even in
the enforcement of a collectiveJbargaining
agreement, would not state a claim for breach
of the duty of fair representation, and we
endorse that view today.
Id. at 372-73 (italics added).
Thus, the union’s refusal to take an employee’s
grievance to arbitration is wrongful "only if it can be
fairly characterized as so far outside a ’wide range of
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reasonableness’ that it is wholly irrational or
’arbitrary’." Airline Pilots v. O’Neill, supra, at 78. A
union has "room to make discretionary decisions and
choices, even if those judgments are ultima~ely
wrong." Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc., 525
U.S. 33, 45-46 (1998). For that reason, even success
on the merits of the violation, in a hybrid § 301 ~,~uit
against the employer, does not alone sustain a
breach of the duty of fair representation. Vaca v.
Sipes, supra, at 192-93. As a leading treatise put~,~ it:
If the union has inwestigated the case and
considered the merits, its refusal to proceed
even on the ground that. however "arguable,"
it was unlikely to prevail before an arbitrator
--or even that the outcome was less than
encouraging--puts an end to the claim.
GORMAN & FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW,
supra, at 1006 (citing authority). So long as hones~tly
arrived at, a union is free to make a mistaken.
flawed, or negligent judgment of whether to proceed
to arbitration, of what issues to present if it does
proceed or what arguments to make. E.g., Pease
v. Production Workers Union, 386 F.3d 819 (7th
Cir. 2004). As Judge Easterbrook put it, with olaly
a touch of hyperbole, federal labor law expects
disputes about the application of collective
bargaining agreements to be "resolved by the affected
parties over the bargaining table, or by arbitrators
knowledgeable about the business, rather than in
court. That’s why a hybrid contract/DFR suit does
not get to first base unless the worker shows that the
union has abandoned him ~o the wolves." Id. at 823.
The Petitioners argue that in "today’s integrated
workforce and diverse unions" the potential of unic,ns
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intentionally refusing to arbitrate "meritorious
discrimination" claims should be discounted. Brief
for the Petitioners at 44. That is quite correct, but
beside the point. A union’s erroneous judgment,
doubt, or uncertainty that a violation of a civil right
could be proved, arrived at honestly but mistakenly,
no matter how well-intentioned, is no substitute for
an adjudication of whether an employee’s civil rights
were actually violated. However well versed the
union is in the bargaining history of the collective
agreement, however enmeshed in the application of
the collective agreement over time giving rise to an
accretion of shared meaning and expectation, to the
"common law of the shop," that shapes the union’s
decisions on what contractual grievances to pursue.
the union’s iudgment on whether a statute has been
violated is, to say the least, in no way similarly
informed.
Although some union locals may follow a
grievance screening process that can be trial-like
in rigor, LEONARD SAYLES & GEORGE STRAUSS,
THE LOCAL UNION 44--45 (2d ed. 1967) (still the
authoritative study), such internal procedures are
not legally mandated; and pressure from the rank-
and-file, one way or another, is part-and-parcel of the
grievance screening process, often including voting
by the union membership on whether to pursue a
grievance to arbitration. Id. at 104-05; e.g., Lee
v. Cytec Indus. Inc., 460 F.3d 673, 677 (5th Cir.
2006) (pursuant to the union’s rules, the failure of
the grievant to self-process his grievance to an
authorizing vote of the union membership bars
his claim). In other words, the duty of fair
representation simply cannot be "divorced from the
bargaining process," Matthew Finkin, The Limits of
2O
Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 64 MINN. L.
REV. 183, 237 (1980), which is why the Court refused
to draw a distinction between contract bargaining
and grievance processing in the standards of l~air
representation. Airline Pilots Ass’n v. O’Neill, supra.
Simply put: a union would not breach its duty of
fair representation if it declines to take the
grievance to arbitration because it believes tlhat
aggressively advocating a merely arguable or
colorable discrimination claim would jeopardize its
strategic relationship to the company, cf. infra note
7, or because more pressing contractual claims have
a higher priority on the allocation of the limited
resources the local has available for arbitration.
These are just the :kind of judgments the
collective’s majority and local officers must make.
Indeed, the embeddedness of grievance processing in
the collective bargaining process, which played so
influential a role in Gardner-Denver, is placed in
stark relief in this case. The grievants’ age claim
presented two alternative ADEA theories: that l~he
subcontract that caused their reassignment was
let by their employer to effect that very end, i.e..
because of their age a disparate treatment theory;
or, that irrespective of :motive, the decision to
subcontract had an age-discriminatory effect and so
required proof of reasonable business justification---a
disparate impact claim. Note that both theories
hinge on the decision to subcontract. But under
Art. 54 of the collective agreement, subcontracting
of bargaining unit work is absolutely prohibited:
management’s decision to subcontract could not be
made without the union’s agreement or acquiescence.
Thus, the union’s assertion of the employee’s ADEA
claim in arbitration would, of necessity, challenge its
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own decision, either directly or consequentially, to
allow the subcontract.
The union could have made the decision to permit
the subcontract in utmost good faith, honestly,
without hostile discrimination or intent to violate the
ADEA. but unaware of the disparate impact on these
employees. It could accordingly decline to pursue the
age claim on an honest but arguably mistaken belief
that its decision did not abet the company’s alleged
discriminatory act. Were Gardner-Denver to be
abandoned, a union’s honest if mistaken and possibly
negligent belief in the propriety of management’s
decision would mean that affected employees would
be denied any forum for the vindication of their civil
rights.
From a larger perspective, it is understandable
that a company would want civil rights claims to be
subsumed into the grievance-arbitration procedure of
the collective agreement: not only is the prospect of
civil litigation ending in a jury trial foreclosed, but
the company would bear no liability for wrongful
discriminatory conduct if the union does not breach
the duty of fair representation in declining to take
the claim to arbitration; and. inasmuch as the
standard of fair representation is in practice so
highly deferential to the union, Goldberg, The Duty
of Fair Representation: What the Courts Do in Fact,
34 BUFFALO L. REV. 89 (1985), in practical terms the
company’s potential exposure would be much reduced
and, in some instances, entirely eliminated. Even if
the union does fall afoul of the duty in not
arbitrating the claim, thereby allowing the lawsuit
against the employer to proceed, the union would
bear a significant share of any resulting liability.
Bowen v. U.S. Postal Service, 451 U.S. 212 (1983).
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Consequently, the employer would clearly benefit
by shifting these risks on to the union; but,
concomitantly, a union would be most unlikely to
assume the risks of becoming the sole guara~Ltor
of the employees’ statutory civil rights unless
some quid pro quo made it worth the union’s while.
The Petitioner asserts as much here: "IT]he Union
gained sizeable wage and benefits enhancements, as
well as other favorable provisions, in exchange for
its agreement to arbitrate its members’ statuV~ry
employment claims." Brief for the Petitioners at 6:
id. at 14 ("It is appropriate for a union to bargain
collectively over the method of resolving such claims
in exchange for valuable concessions, as occurred
here.").
That would have to be the basis of the bargain,
and it should be of no effect: an individual’s ciLvil
rights should be no more disposable by a majority’s
will--by subsuming them exclusively into the
grievance process the majority controls--than they
are dispensable by a majority’s will, by deciding on a
case-by-case basis whose civil rights to vindicate.6
This is not because the majority might be hostile to
the claim or even indifferent to it, but because, even
6 The Petitioners advert to t]he fact that rights granted by
the Labor Act to further the process of collective bargaining
may be relinquished by collective agreement. Brief for the
Petitioners at 23-24. However, that says nothing about those
individual civil rights that are insulated from majoritarian
control; and. it should be noted, even some statutory rights ti~at
inhere in the system of collective representation are insulated
from majoritarian dispensation. Matthew Finkin, The Limits
of Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, supra, at 190~-91
(observing that not only "external law" but certain aspects of
the Labor Act "are insulated from disposition by a majority,"
and discussing NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974)).
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if the grievance is investigated with painstaking care
and in utmost good faith, other concerns relevant to
the union’s role in collective bargaining may persuade
it against pressing the grievance to arbitration.
II. GARDNER-DENVER PLACES NO BURDEN
ON EMPLOYERS
Rather early on. critics of Gardner-Denver thought
it gave unionized employees "two bites on the apple"
of civil rights protection. This was addressed in the
still leading study by Michele Hoyman and Lamont
Stallworth. The Arbitration of Discrimination
Grievances in the Aftermath of Gardner-Denver, 39
ARB. J. 45, 57 (Sept. 1984), more on which below.
The "two bites" criticism has recurred in the wake
of Gilmer v. Interstate~Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S.
20 (1991); that is, because non-unionized employers
may adopt employment arbitration for the definitive
disposition of their employees’ civil rights claims
while unionized employers may not sweep those claims
into labor arbitration for definitive disposition, the
maintenance of two distinct tracks for the protection
of civil rights in the latter employments is perceived
to be burdensome to unionized employers, if only in
comparison.
It is true that non-unionized employers have
sought employment arbitration because they see it as
more advantageous to them than civil litigation: the
process is swift, informal, inexpensive, and of low
visibility. As the Petitioners quite rightly argue,
these advantages are also accommodated in the
unionized workplace where contractual discrimination
claims can be conjoined with other contractual claims
and both might be resolved satisfactorily in a single
proceeding. Brief for the Petitioners at 26-30. But
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none of these advantages requires that preclusive
effect be given to the decisions of labor arbitrators
when treating statutory civil rights. Let us look
more closely at how the system actually works.
Under Gardner-Denver and Vaca v. Sipes. a union
is free to select those grievances it will take up
through the grievance procedure. If it chooses
not to pursue a discrimination claim to arbitration
the grievant is free to pursue her claim in court.
But if it does choose to take it up, the process can
be swift (subject, as here, to a contractual statute
of limitations), informal (a series of steps is
commonly provided, as here, in which the facts and
circumstances can be aired), costless to the griewLnt,
of low public visibility, and, for contractual purpo~,~es,
final: but only those intractable cases about which
the union is strongly motivated will actually go to
arbitration.7
If the union prevails in arbitration on the
contractual discrimination claim the matter would be
at an end, assuming an effective remedy is afforded
the grievant. If the union does not prevail, the
7 The substitution of employment arbitration for the co~rts
is premised on the assumption that employees are all too often
unable to secure legal representation where "the stakes are too
small and outcomes too uncertain." Samuel Estreicher, Sat~trns
for Rickshaws: The Stakes i1~ the Debate over Predispute
Employment Arbitratio~ Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RES.
559, 563 (2001). But it is in just that category of case--where
the outcomes are most uncertain--that the duty of fair
representation is most deferential to union refusals to proceed
to arbitration. Section I. supra. Thus, the relegation of
these employees to the exclusive resort to the union would
be antithetical to the fundamental policy assumption of
employment arbitration, which is to make it possible for just
those kinds of claims actually to be heard.
25
individual grievant may avail herself of legal relief
de novo. though the arbitration decision can be given
weight as evidence in the later civil proceeding.
Gardner-Denver Co.. supra, at 60 n.21. For that
employee the system functions as, in effect, one of
advisory arbitration. Akin to some other pre-trial
alternative dispute resolution devices, such as "mini
trials," the employee (and her lawyer) secures a
sense of how a neutral adjudicator would assess the
strength of her claim and is in a better position to
judge whether further legal recourse de novo would
be worth the candle.
The leading study on how the dual track system
actually works surveyed practitioners for case
disposition in the immediate period after Gardner-
Denver, 1974-1981: there has been no more recent
research. In this study’s sample, 1~761 grievances
involving employment discrimination had been
arbitrated under collective agreements. Of these,
307 (17%) were relitigated; 21 of these (6.8%)
resulted in judgments that differed from the arbitral
disposition. Michele Hoyman & Lamont Stallworth,
The Arbitration of Discrimination Grievances in the
Aftermath of Gardner-Denver, supra. In other
words~ in the vast majority of cases (83%) the
employee either prevailed in arbitration or, having
lost. decided against relitigating the claim. Though
diligent research has revealed no more recent data,
amicus NAA has no reason to believe the relitigation
rate has significantly increased: in fact, the very
want of research interest suggests the absence of a
pressing problem. It is most plausible that. the
more experience lawyers have had since 1984, the
more employees are likely to be counseled of the
unlikelihood that they will be successful contrary to
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the labor arbitrator’s disposition and the less likely
will the employee be to incur the costs of further
judicial resort. Indeed, the Court’s allowance of the
arbitration award into evidence in such a case serves
as just such a sobering caution. Gardner-Denver,
supra, at 60 n.21.
Consequently, de novo litigation would be availed
of under Gardner-Denver only by those relatively :Few
unionized employees who believe so strongly tlhat
their civil rights had been violated that they are
willing to incur the costs of securing legal counsel to
pursue that resort despite an arbitral determination
to the contrary. The 7% who relitigate and succeed
in court contrary to the labor arbitration, while
scarcely enough to encourage de novo litigation, is
not an insignificant figure from the perspective of
vindicating civil rights. But, more important, un.:ler
Gardner-Denver judicial resort remains available to
those unionized employees whose claims are :not
pursued by their unions to arbitration without
breach of the duty of fair representation.
Amicus NAA submits that this state of affairs is
scarcely unduly burdensome to employers:s in ~he
s Petitioners argue that unless preclusive effect is given
unionized employers will "cut unions out Of the process" by
exercising their "well established[" right to impose employment
arbitration unilaterally. Brief for the Petitioners at 32. citing
the only decision on point thus far, arising under the Raihvay
Labor Act, not the National Labor Relations Act, see Air Line
Pilots’Ass’n Int’l v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 477 (D.C.
Cir. 1999). Two observations should suffice. First, a solitary
decision on a novel propositio~a does make the law "well
established." In fact, the National Labor Relations Board has
yet to pass on the question the analysis of which is actually
rather complicated. GORMAN & FINKIN. BASIC TEXT ON LABOR
LAW. supra, at § 21.9. Second, and closely related, the fact that
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case of employees whose claims are not resolved to
their satisfaction in arbitration, the "second bite," if
such it be--see Conclusion. infra--is infrequently
taken; but when it is employees prevail to a small
but not insignificant extent. In the case of employees
whose claims have not been taken to arbitration,
there will have been no "first bite" to begin with.
As the Petitioners candidly recognize, were
Gardner-Denver to be abandoned, the only recourse
for employees whose claims were not arbitrated
is either: (1) to persuade the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to litigate on their
behalf, Brief for the Petitioners at 43; or (2) to bring
§ 301 hybrid claims that condition the vindication of
the civil right on the employee’s success in a claim of
breach of the duty of fair representation, id. at 42-
43. The EEOC would not be expected routinely to
litigate on behalf of every discriminatee who fails to
persuade her union to take her case. EEOC v. Waffle
House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279. 290 n.7 (2002). Nor, in
view of the high degree of deference given unions,
Section I, supra, would we expect a significant
number of employees to prevail in § 301 suits, no
matter how meritorious the statutory claim turns
out to be, for want of breach of the duty of fair
representation.
In practical effect, employees whose civil rights
claims are not arbitrated have scant recourse. In
that sense, the Petitioners are clearly correct: as to
those whose civil rights are not arbitrated, the law,
there has been only one litigated instance of this occurring
indicates that unionized employers have encountered no great
burden as a result of Gardner-Denver’s continuing vitality; they
have seen no need to take that action in the decade and a half
since Gilmer.
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as they would have it. would be less burdensome to
employers. But it is equally clear that the law would
be commensurately less protective of civil rights.
CONCLUSION
Today, as in 1974, we have two separate systems,
differently derived and differently administered,
that create and vindicate rights in the unionized
workplace--external law and collective self-
government. To borrow from amicus NAA’s brief to
this Court in Wright v. Universal Maritime Service
Corp., supra, unionized workers do not have "two
bites" at the workplace rights apple, they have
two different apples. That is scarcely anomalous;
indeed, this Court has recently reemphasized
Gardner-Denver’s observation that employment
discrimination legislation has "’long evinced a
general intent to accord parallel or overlapping
remedies.’" CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 128
S. Ct. 1951, 1961 (2008) (quoting Gardner-Denver,
supra, at 47). These separate systems have worked
well in tandem for more than thirty years. In amicus
NAA’s judgment, it would disrupt the system of
industrial self-government and do damage to the
vindication of civil rights--to conflate them.
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